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ABSTRACT
In this experiment I investigated the relationship between set-switching and transfer
learning, both of which presumably invoke executive functioning (EF), which may in turn be
correlated with intelligence. Set-switching was measured by a computerized version of the
Wisconsin Card Sort Task. Another computer task was written to measure learning-transfer
ability. The data indicate little correlation between the ability to transfer learning and the
capacity for set-switching. That is, these abilities may draw from independent cognitive
mechanisms. The major difference may be requirement to utilize previous learning in a new way
in the learning-transfer task.
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1
Set-switching and Learning Transfer
There exists a long-standing debate as to the precise nature of intelligence and how it
should be measured. Gardner’s (1983) theory of multiple intelligences suggests that there are
seven distinct types of intellectual abilities. Sternberg (1985) postulated three sets of
components constituting cognitive capacity. Perhaps the most widely accepted model is
Spearman’s (1904) general intelligence model, which is hierarchical and includes several broad
abilities, such as visuo-spatial, memory, and verbal ability (Kane & Brand, 2006). At the top of
the hierarchy is a general intelligence factor, g. This factor has been used successfully in
accounting for performance on a wide variety of cognitive tests, although much mystery still
remains as to the nature of underlying general mechanisms (Kolata, Light, Grossman, Hale, &
Martzel, 2007).
The general intelligence model shares common features with Baddeley and Hitch’s
(1974) model of working memory, which includes specialized storage systems (e.g., a
phonological loop, a visuo-spatial sketchpad) coordinated by a general central executive.
Research findings support a strong relationship between g and working memory. Miyake and
Friedman (2001) found that executive functioning combined with visuo-spatial or language skills
are good indicators of g. Likewise, Colom and Rebollo (2005, p.624) contended that working
memory and g are “almost isomorphic concepts.” Kolata et al. (2007) found that general
learning abilities were correlated to the selective attention component but not the short-term
memory component of working memory. In other words, these theorists claim that working
memory is closely related to, and perhaps even synonymous with, the most popular notion of
intelligence, g. However, debate remains as to which component(s) of working memory best
represent g.
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The phonological loop is the component of working memory that stores verbal material
and allows for its rehearsal and/or maintenance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). The visuo-spatial
sketchpad is a storage facility for visual and spatial material. The central executive is
responsible for actively coordinating the other two systems. This includes decision making,
attention focusing, and reasoning (Logie, 1995). Because the central executive’s role in working
memory entails the greatest responsibility, it would seem to be a good candidate for being the
most closely related to g.
The operation of the central executive is referred to as executive functioning (EF) and is
often invoked when nonlearned responses are required (Towse & Houston-Price, 2001). The
central executive can also direct attention to an important stimulus, a process called ‘selective
attention’ (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Through this action, new learning ensues. In some cases,
this new learning must necessarily overwrite old learning. An example of this is found in the
Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST), which can be used as a measure of EF. The WCST requires
participants to sort cards on the basis of some rule, and then to switch to a new rule when the
task changes. The rules constantly change, creating the dual challenge of learning new rules and
inhibiting the old ones. For each rule in the WCST, participants must develop a unique rule-like
strategy used for responding to the stimuli, known as a response set. As rules change on
subsequent problems, participants must generate and employ appropriate response sets. Rule
changing (as required by tasks like the WCST) entails an ability to switch response sets, whereby
one must inhibit previously learned rules and apply new ones. This cognitive operation is known
as set-switching. In the WCST, for example, one may be sorting cards on the basis of color (a
“color response set”) and then switch to a different response set (e.g., shape).
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As the coordinator of the memory systems of working memory, the central executive
presumably controls set-switching. Because the studies discussed earlier indicate a close
relationship between working memory and intelligence, it is possible that set-switching ability,
as a potentially large component of EF, is itself a major component of g. Supporting this theory,
Dempstser (1991) believed that inhibitory processes, like those required by set-switching, are a
substantial dimension of intelligence. He supports this claim by citing neurological evidence and
the requirement for suppression of nonrelevant information on many tasks. Other studies have
shown a significant correlation between executive abilities and performance on general
intelligence tests (Aristide, Bernardo, Grazia, & Gaspare, 2006). These studies, taken together,
indicate the possibility of a close relationship between intelligence and EF as reflected in setswitching ability. However, the nature of this relationship remains unclear.
If the WCST, as a measure of EF, does predict intelligence, then a closer examination of
the cognitive mechanisms involved in performing the WCST may reveal the cognitive
mechanisms that influence intelligence. Performance on the WCST is measured by
perseveration errors, which occur when a participant responds according to an old rule even
though he or she is aware that a new rule is in effect. Thus, a perseveration error occurs when an
incorrect response set is used and is an error in set-switching. Presumably, perseveration errors
result from failure to inhibit the previously learned response set, failure to implement the new
response set, or a combination of both. Because the WCST is thought to measure EF,
determining the cause of perseveration errors would help determine how EF is related to
intelligence.
These types of errors may also occur when organisms are required to adapt previous
learning to solve novel problems. This capability, known as the ability to transfer learning,

4
requires one to transform previous learning to meet new demands. The difference between the
abilities of set-switching and learning transfer is subtle yet potentially significant. To set-switch,
one must abstain from using an old strategy and instead implement a new one. To transfer
learning, one must apply old learning (knowledge acquired through previous experience) in a
new way or to a new problem. The similarities between set-switching and learning transfer are
obvious: Both cases require new learning to occur through a change in response set. Because
they both entail a change in response to a stimulus, they also must both involve inhibition of the
previously learned responses. For set-switching, usage of the previous rule must be sufficiently
inhibited so that the new response set is employed. For transfer of learning, the inhibition must
be less complete because the previously learned response is the mandatory starting point for rule
transformation and subsequent new response. Because set-switching and learning transfer both
entail inhibition and learning, it is reasonable to speculate that the significant difference between
the two may lie in the capacity to modify previous learning, found only in learning transfer. This
ability implies neural plasticity and the ability to deviate from rigorous stimulus-response habit
patterns.
Because of the similar demands both capacities place on EF, one would expect the ability
to set-switch to correlate highly with the ability to transfer learning. Due to EF’s relationship to
general intelligence (as previously discussed), it is likely that set-switching and learning transfer
abilities would be components of general intelligence. If this were the case, then it would be
important to determine which cognitive mechanisms are responsible for the correlation between
EF (as reflected in set switching) and transfer learning. In what way, if any, is the ability to
inhibit previous response patterns in set-switching related to the general ability to learn and to
transfer learning to new contexts? In this experiment I aimed to begin the process of
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understanding these underlying mechanisms. This was done by looking specifically at setswitching and learning reversal abilities, which were measured by two tasks that seemed
intuitively to make very similar cognitive demands. The demands were so similar that one
would expect performance on the learning transfer task to predict performance on the setswitching task. If this is the case, then transfer learning ability may be further pursued as an
indicator of EF and intelligence. If little correlation is found, then these constructs may point to
distinct, independent cognitive abilities.
As a conventional measure of set-switching and EF, the WCST was utilized. As a
measure of learning transfer ability, an assessment has been developed and tested: the transfer
index, henceforth referred to as TI. The concept of ‘TI’ was created by Rumbaugh (1969,
Rumbaugh & Pate, 1984) to quantify intelligence, particularly of nonhuman primates, through
learning reversal ability. Reversing learning is a special instance of learning transfer, where the
desired response, once learned, becomes the undesired response. Hence, in order to generate the
newly desired response, one must recall the previously desired response and perform in the
opposite way. Thus, the desired response is a modification of previously learned behavior.
Traditional intelligence tests are subject to numerous criticisms. For instance, one never
knows how much a person has learned prior to testing (e.g., as the result of culture, schooling, or
previous exposure to tests) that might inflate the estimate of that person’s ability to learn. In
learning transfer tests, these biases are minimal because novel problems are presented that have
never been learned. Every person or animal being tested begins with the same level of
knowledge about the problem. As such, tests designed around the transfer index paradigm would
be both unbiased and unresponsive to a person’s previous educational experiences. Establishing
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the connection between learning transfer ability and intelligence would facilitate the design of
these tests.
Rumbaugh’s TI is designed to control for individual and species differences in the
amount of prior education or training, familiarity with testing, and other confounds unrelated to
intelligence. The procedure begins by allowing the organism to learn a novel problem to a
specified performance level (Rumbaugh 1969, Rumbaugh & Pate, 1984). Once the learning
criterion is reached, the problem is reversed so that the same response rule applies, but in the
opposite way. For instance, if the initial rule was to respond on the basis of size by selecting the
larger of two items, after reversal one is correct for selecting on the basis of size by indicating
the smaller item. Rumbaugh and colleagues have shown that relatively intelligent animals (i.e.,
those with relatively large and encephalized brains, and that learn well in a variety of other
situations) tend to apply the original rule they learned to the new conditions well, whereas less
intelligent organisms tend not to reverse the response cues and rather to respond in whatever way
had previously been reinforced. Moreover, previous studies by Rumbaugh indicate that the
better the rule is learned prior to reversal (i.e., the higher the prereversal criterion level is set), the
bigger the difference in performance between individuals with relatively good versus poor
learning ability. In other words, as the requirement for prereversal accuracy is increased, postreversal performance becomes more difficult for less intelligent organisms and relatively easier
for more intelligent organisms. Presumably, this difference results from the differing levels of
sophistication of rules generated by animals of varying intelligence. For animals that are more
controlled by stimulus-response-associative forms of learning, the more reinforcement they have
received for a certain response, the harder it is for them to abandon that response in favor of
another stimulus. Such animals might generate rules that concern only the specific stimulus-
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response connections that have been previously experienced. With repetition, these connections
strengthen in the form of habit. For animals that are capable of relational forms of learning,
reinforcement strengthens the rule, not the habit to responding to any particular stimulus
indicated by the rule. These animals are more likely to base their responses on rules they have
abstracted from a variety of stimulus-response relationships they have previously experienced.
Thus, these animals transfer learning well whenever the stimulus conditions change but the rule
remains constant.
Rumbaugh (1969) quantified the TI by relating participant performance from one task or
problem (unique set of stimuli) to the next with the rules changing only between problems.
Specifically, the TI was the performance after the rule change divided by performance before the
rule change. A higher TI implied a greater ability to adapt the old rule to the new situation.

Performance after rule change
TI =

Performance before rule change

As a provisional measure, I employed in this experiment a modified TI that only reflects
participant performance above and beyond what would have been expected for random guessing.
The TI task implemented here required binary responses only; so random guessing should have
yielded 50% correct. This measure was named the transfer index corrected, or TIC. As with TI,
greater TIC indicated greater learning transfer. A negative TIC indicated that the participant’s
performance after the rule change was worse than what would have been expected from random
guessing.

O
TIC =

(Performance after rule change) – (performance from random guessing)
(Performance before rule change) – (performance from random guessing)
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ther researchers have found that there may exist a significant relationship between the ability to
reverse learning and intelligence. For instance, Rajalakshmi and Jeeves (1965) found that
reversal learning correlates more highly than discrimination learning with intelligence in
children, as measured by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). This experiment
sought to continue this line of inquiry. If the ability to transfer learning is discovered to be a
viable measure of EF and, by extension, intelligence, then intelligence tests could be constructed
utilizing TI concepts to achieve greater validity. Whereas many conventional tests often measure
intelligence by how much a person knows, an intelligence test based on learning transfer ability
could measure intelligence by how easily a person can transfer her learning.
The hypothesis of this experiment is that the ability to transfer learning, as measured by a
Learning Reversal Task will predict the ability to switch response sets efficiently, as measured
by the WCST.
Method
Participants
Forty-five Georgia State University undergraduate students participated in this study (27
were female and 18 were male). In return, they were each given one hour of credit towards
fulfilling their research requirements for an introductory psychology course. Recruitment,
registration for time slots, and credit dispensation were done using Sona Systems, a web-based
software solution for subject pool management. All participants had normal or corrected-tonormal vision. The participants were between 17 and 45 years old and had a mean age of 20.5
years.
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Apparatus and Tasks
The experiment was administered on four Dell personal computers running Windows XP
with 17-inch monitors. Each computer contained two relevant Visual Basic programs: the
Learning Reversal Task and the WCST, both written by David Washburn, Ph.D. of Georgia State
University. The participants utilized the keyboard during the program’s execution.
The Learning Reversal Task was a game written specifically for this experiment in which
the participants had to continually adapt to its changing rules. Through the process of trial and
error, the participant was expected to learn the rule and use it to make accurate determinations of
which of two stimuli was correct. If the participant demonstrated sufficient prowess using the
rule, then the rule was changed. At that point, the participants had to discover and learn a new
rule, while mentally suppressing or altering any learning that remained of the old rule.
As shown in Figure 1, the game presented two binary strings of numbers, one of which
was correct by the rule and the other incorrect. The rule was determined randomly by the
computer, which generated a prototype stimulus at the beginning of each game. The prototype
consisted of one or two randomly generated binary stimuli (‘1’ or ‘0’), each placed in randomly
generated positions within the sequence of digits. Each sequence contained a total of four digits,
including the prototype digit(s). Once the prototype values and positions were set, they did not
vary until the next problem. The positions that were not fixed by the prototype were allowed to
vary randomly. For example, suppose that the computer generated a prototype where the first
position was a ‘1’ and the third position was a ‘0’. In this example, the second and fourth
positions would vary randomly. Hence, possible stimuli included ‘1001’, ‘1101’, ‘1000’, and
‘1100’. (For illustrative purposes, the prototype digits are indicated by bold type; they were not
obviously distinguished from other digits in the actual stimulus presentations.)
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The prototype and its supplemental random digits were randomly presented on either the
left or right side of the screen. The participant guessed which answer was correct by pressing the
arrow key that corresponded with the left or right stimulus. When the participants selected the
string that was in accordance with the rule, the word “CORRECT” appeared on the screen.
Otherwise, their choice was wrong and “INCORRECT” displayed. After a second and a half, the
feedback word disappeared and the process began again as two new stimuli appeared on the
screen.
The rule changed when the participant was determined to be sufficiently proficient in her
use of the current rule. The participant’s acquisition of the rule was determined statistically by
the percentage of correct selections over previous trials since the presentation of the new
problem. For a reversal to occur, a minimum of 10 trials must have elapsed since the last
reversal. In the case that 22 or more trials had elapsed since the previous reversal, only the 21
most current responses were included in the calculation. In the event that sixty trials passed
without the participant acquiring the rule to the criterion level, the problem was ended and the
next one was initiated. For the Learning Reversal Task, participants were tested to two different
criterion levels. On the first ten problems, the criterion level was 67% correct binary selections
for rule acquisition. On the second ten problems, they were required to score 80% correct before
the rule was considered acquired.
When the criterion level was attained, be it 67% or 80% depending on the portion of the
experiment, the rule was then changed in order to indicate that a new rule is in effect. The
change of rule was indicated by a valence reversal of the sorting criteria. Hence, if a ‘1’ was
required at a particular spot before the rule change, then a ‘0’ would be displayed at that spot
after the rule change. If the participant continued to choose by the previous rule, then he was
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informed that his selection was incorrect. Here, it was assumed that the participant would
conclude that the rule had changed and that he would begin a new process of trial and error in
order to determine the new rule. After the reversal trial, the participant was then given 10 trials
with the new rule, for a total of 11 trials with the new rule. Performance on the final 10 trials,
not including the rule reversal trial, was compared with pre-reversal accuracy (66.7% or 80%).
The ratio of performance after the reversal to the performance before the reversal was the TI.
For the WCST, sorting rules included color (green, blue, red), number (1, 2, 3), and shape
(circle, triangle, square). For each trial, the participant was shown a stimulus on the screen of
random color, number, and shape. Figure 2 gives an idea of what the WCST displays on the
screen. For clarity in black-and-white printing, horizontal, diagonal, and vertical bars have been
substituted for green, blue, and red colors respectively. As shown in Figure 2, three green
squares might have been displayed. The participant would guess the sorting rule and make a
selection based on that hypothesis. If the rule was guessed to be ‘color,’ then the key ‘1,’ the
selection corresponding to green would be pressed. If the rule was guessed to be ‘shape,’ then
the key ‘2,’ the selection corresponding to squares would be pressed. If the rule was guessed to
be ‘quantity,’ then the key ‘3,’ the key corresponding to three would be pressed. The computer
then displayed ‘CORRECT’ or ‘WRONG’ based on the participant’s answer and the current rule.
Then, a new stimulus was presented and the participant guessed again. By the process of
elimination, the participant could determine what rule the computer was utilizing.
The rule was changed when the participant answered correctly for eight consecutive
trials. Upon realizing that the old one failed to yield correct results, the participant presumably
would then search for the new rule. Continuing to sort by the old rule constituted perseveration
errors.
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Design
Learning Reversal Task. The independent variable was the criterion level to which
participants had to learn the sorting rules. In some cases, they had to achieve 67% correct
responses in the previous prereversal trials (the 10 to 21 most recent trials since new stimuli were
presented) in order to proceed to the next part of the experiment. In other cases, they had to
achieve 80% success to move forward to the reversal trials.
The dependent variables included the number of trials to criterion (NTC) and TI ratio.
NTC represented the number of trials it took participants to achieve a certain percentage of
correct responses. Each participant was required to achieve two success levels, 67% and 80%.
As was discussed above, TI was calculated by percentage of correct answers on the ten trials
following the reversal trial, divided by the criterion level, 67% or 80%. This number indicated
the relative performance of the participant after the reversal versus the performance before the
reversal.
Wisconsin Card Sort Task. The dependent variables on the WCST were the number of
perseveration errors (NPE) and the total number of trials. NPE represented the number of times
during the post-reversal trials that a participant responded in a way that indicated judgment using
the pre-reversal rule. The post-reversal period for one trial was the same as the pre-reversal
period for the next trial. Reversals occurred after eight consecutive correct selections. From
NPE, the mean number of perseverations per problem was calculated. The total number of trials
was the number of trials required to complete all ten problems.
Procedure
Upon arrival, the participants were led to their personal computers. Some participants
would perform the task in a room alone, whereas others shared a testing room with one other
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participant due to space constraints. Once in the room and seated at their computer, the
participants were asked to sign a consent form and given an optional demographics form to
complete. Then, the participants were instructed on how to initiate their tasks. For example,
they were shown the icons on the computer desktop on which they should click in order to
initiate their tasks. Next, participants were given a set of standardized instructions for how to
perform the tasks. After verifying that the participants had no questions, the experimenter left
them to execute their tasks.
First, they ran the Learning Reversal Task, then they ran the Wisconsin Card Sort Task.
They were given one hour in which to complete both tasks. If they had not finished one hour,
then the experimenter stopped the experiment. Before the participants left, the experimenter
debriefed them, offered to answer any of their questions, and thanked them for their time.
Results
Forty-five people participated (mean age 20.5 years old, 27 females and 18 males). For
the Learning Reversal Task, three participants did not learn any problems to the 67% criterion
level. Four other participants did not learn any problems to the 80% criterion level. Six
participants did not complete the WCST before the hour allotted to the experiment had elapsed.
In total, 33 of the participants reached criterion for both the 67% and 80% learning levels for the
Learning Reversal Task and completed the WCST. These results reflect only the data from these
33 participants.
Learning Reversal Task
The TI ratio for problems learned to the 67% criterion level had a mean of 0.75 and
ranged from 0.50 to 1.06, SD = 0.16. TIC for 67% had a mean of 0.0063 and ranged from -0.97
to 1.24, SD = 0.62. To obtain the 67% criterion level, participants required a mean of 24 trials
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and ranged between 11 and 37 trials, SD = 6.9. In 74% of the problems, participants did not
learn to criterion level. Of the 10 problems presented, participants learned a mean of 3.6
problems to the criterion level, with a range between 1 and 7 problems, SD = 1.5. For the 67%
learning level, the median averaged TI was 0.729; the 25% and 75% percentiles were 0.582 and
0.861 respectively.
For problems learned to the 80% criterion, the TI had a mean of 0.68 and ranged from
0.37 to 0.96, SD = 0.12. TIC in this case had a mean of 0.16 and ranged from -0.68 to 0.89, SD
= 0.33. Participants required a mean of 19 trials and ranged between 11 and 30 trials to reach the
80% criterion level, SD = 5.3. They learned a mean of 4.9 problems to the 80 % criterion level
and ranged between 1 and 8 problems, SD = 2.3. For the 80% learning level, the median
averaged TI was 0.694; the 25% and 75% percentiles were 0.597 and 0.750 respectively.
Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST)
For the WCST, performance also varied widely. Overall, participants answered a mean
of 72% of the problems correctly and ranged between 45% and 87%, SD = 11%. For 10
reversals, they required a mean of 218 trials with a range between 134 and 588 trials, SD = 117.
Three participants did not complete 10 reversals, though they continued guessing for over 1000
trials. Their data was not included in these results.
The mean total number of perseveration errors over 10 reversals for the WCST was 15
perseverations and varied between 3 and 36 perseverations, SD = 7.5. The median number of
perseveration errors was 13.0; the 25% and 75% percentiles were 9.5 and 19.5 perseverations
respectively. The mean perseverations per problem was 1.6 perseverations and varied between
0.33 and 4.0 perseverations, SD = 0.84. The median number of perseverations per problem was
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1.44 perseverations; the 25% and 75% percentiles were 1.06 and 2.17 perseverations
respectively.
Correlation between Learning Reversal Task and WCST
Multiple variables from the Learning Reversal Task and the WCST were compared. For
the Learning Reversal Task, the average number required to reach criterion level and the average
transfer indexes were compared to the WCST mean number of perseverations per problem and
the total trials required for completion.
A regression analysis was employed to relate pre-reversal performance on the learning
reversal task to the mean number of perseveration errors on the WCST. Pre-reversal
performance was indicated by the mean number of trials required to reach criterion. In neither
the 67% nor the 80% learning scenario, was initial learning ability of the rule significantly
correlated to WCST perseveration errors. As shown in Figure 3, when the rule was learned to
67%, the correlation approached significance F(1, 31) = 3.59, p = 0.068, R2 = 0.104. Results
were less correlated when the rule was learned to 80%, F(1, 31) < 0.00, p = .993, R2 = 0.00.
Post-reversal performance on the Learning Reversal Task (indicated by average TI was
then compared by regression analysis to the mean number of perseveration errors on the WCST.
For problems learned to neither the 67% nor the 80% criterion level was the TI significantly
correlated to WCST perseveration errors. Thus, as shown in Figure 4, post-reversal performance
in the 67% case did not predict performance on the WCST, F(1, 31) = 0.198, p = 0.659, R2 =
0.006. Likewise, learning the rule to 80% also yielded insignificant results, F(1, 31) = 0.159, p =
.693, R2 = 0.005.
In a similar manner, TIC was compared to the mean number of perseveration errors on
the WCST. Post-reversal performance in the 67% case did not predict performance on the
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WCST, F(1, 31) = 0.165, p = 0.688, R2 = 0.005. Likewise, learning the rule to 80% also yielded
insignificant results, F(1, 31) = 0.123, p = .729, R2 = 0.004.
Post-reversal performance on the Learning Reversal Task (indicated by average TI was
then compared by regression analysis to the total number of trials required to complete the
WCST. For problems learned to the 67% criterion level, the TI significantly predicted WCST
total trials, WCST, F(1, 31) = 10.6, p = 0.003, R2 = 0.504. However, learning the rule to 80%
criterion did not predict the total number of WCST trials, F(1, 31) = 2.44, p = .129, R2 = 0.270.
Next, an extreme-groups analysis of variance was performed to see whether grouping
participants by TI performance into quartile and median splits revealed differences between the
groups in the mean number of perseverations per problem on the WCST. The best and worst
performers of TI (grouped by quartiles) did not differ in WCST perseverations, F(1, 13) = 0.001,
p = 0.976 for the 67% criterion; F(1, 14) = 0.157, p = 0.698 for the 80% criterion. Likewise,
median splitting of performers at the 67% criterion level did not reveal group differences in
perseverations perseverations, F(1, 31) = 0.922, p = 0.345 for the 67% criterion; F(1, 31) =
0.532, p = 0.471 for the 80% criterion.
Although TI-based groups did not differ with respect to number of perseverations on the
WCST, they did differ significantly on the total number of trials required by participants to
complete the WCST. On the TI at 67% criterion, participants required significantly more trials
on the WCST for bottom quartile versus the top quartile, F(1, 13) = 4.66, p = 0.05. Bottom
quartile performers were ones with TI < 0.582 and required a mean of 329 trials to complete the
WCST. Top quartile performers had a TI > 0.861 and required a mean 176 WCST trials.
Likewise, quartile splits of performers on the TI at 80% learning revealed significant differences
in total number of trials on the WCST, F(1, 14) = 4.84, p = .045. The top 25% of TI performers
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(TI > 0.750) required a mean of 173 trials to complete the WCST, whereas the bottom 25% (TI <
0.597) required a mean of 314 trials.
High and low performers on the WCST, as measured by mean number of perseverations
per problem, were also divided by quartile and median splits. Univariate analysis showed that
top and bottom quartile groups on the WCST did not differ with respect to TI on problems at the
67% criterion level, F(1, 14) = 0.229, p = 0.640 or the 80% criterion level, F(1, 14) = 0.171, p =
0.685. Similarly, univariate analysis showed that top and bottom groups from median splits of
the WCST perseveration distributions did not yield different TI scores at the 67% criterion level,
F(1, 31) = 0.373, p = 0.546, or the 80% criterion level, F(1, 31) = 1.205, p = 0.281.
Discussion
Despite the similarities between the tasks and the reasonable expectation that both would
related to general intelligence, set-switching was unassociated to learning transfer in this study
for both the 67% nor the 80% criterion levels. It is clear from these results that either the ability
to reverse learning and set-switching are independent capacities or that the tests used here were
not valid measures of these abilities. Assuming the former to be the case, it is likely that setswitching and transfer learning draw from independent cognitive mechanisms. As noted in the
introduction, set-switching requires response set changing whereas learning transfer involves
response set modification. Although set-switching draws heavily from inhibitory processes,
learning transfer also requires some level of inhibition. Possibly, the requirement of learning
transfer to modify previous learning draws from a unique cognitive ability and accounts for the
significant difference between the two is that abilities. It is possible that individual differences in
this ability to modify learning accounted for the lack of correlation between set-switching and
learning transfer. Such a conclusion is commensurate with Rumbaugh’s findings that less
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encephalized organisms have a reduced ability to alter previously learned responses (Rumbaugh
& Pate, 1984). However, the question remains as to whether or not the individual differences in
learning reversal ability in this study predict intelligence. An investigation into this relationship
is the next logical step. Ideally, multiple measures of intelligence would be compared to the
ability to reverse learning.
Of all the analysis done examining the relationship between the Learning Reversal Task
and the WCST, only one set of variables showed significant correlation: Quartile splitting of the
top and bottom 25% of performers of TI predicted the total number of trials on the WCST for
both the 67% and 80% criterion cases. However, the factor typically regarded as significant for
the WCST is the number of perseveration errors (a measure of the efficiency of set switching),
not the number of trials required for completion (which is probably a measure of learning itself).
Thus, it is unsurprising that the participants that participants who learned and transferred learning
well on one task also learned faster on the WCST compared to the worst learning-transfer
performers. However, because there was no significant correlation between TI and WCST
perseveration errors, it is likely that WCST perseveration errors and WCST total trials indicate
different things. This could be caused by instances of giving wrong responses and still not
sorting by the previous rule. This is possible because each trial presents the participant with
three choices, one correct for the current rule, one correct for the previous rule, and one not
correct for either. Hence, it is possible to make errors and increase the total number of trials
while at the same time not making perseveration errors (at least not perseveration errors
concerning the immediately preceding problem). It is not clear, however, whether or not these
nonperseveration errors are indicative of EF capacity.
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One other analysis showed that there may exist a significant relationship between
perseveration errors on the WCST and pre-reversal performance on the Learning Reversal Task,
as indicated by the mean number of trials needed to reach the 67% criterion level. In other
words, what presumably is not testing learning reversal ability (pre-reversal performance), is
somewhat predicting EF as measured by WCST perseverations. This could be explained by the
heavy load placed on EF by hypothesis testing in the Learning Reversal Task. If fact, the central
executive could be busier during hypothesis testing, when one must keep track of old hypotheses
and generate new ones, than in post-reversal trials, when it only has to recall the correct
hypothesis and give the opposite response. Fewer trials required to reach criterion implies more
effective hypothesis testing, which may indicate greater EF. If this is true, then prereversal
performance would be a measure of EF. Because WCST perseverations supposedly measure EF
as well, it makes sense that the two would be correlated.
Another possible confound could result from differences in the two computer tasks.
Perhaps they invoked different aspects of working memory due to the different types of stimuli
they presented. Because one task presented shape and color (subject to visual memory) whereas
the other task only presented binary variables (subject to aticulatory rehearsal), different
proportions of the visuo-spatial sketchpad and phonological loop may have been utilized. Future
work could investigate this via a process of distraction utilizing articulatory suppression or
random number generation. The presenting stimuli of the tasks could also be changed.
In this sample that there existed a wide variety of performance levels. Whereas some
participants finished the tasks with near-perfect scores, others never responded in ways that
indicated that they understood the rules of the tasks. Such a variation in performance could be
the result differences in intelligence, familiarity with computer games, motivation, or confidence
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in testing scenarios. It is also noteworthy that most of the participants who did not finish a task,
only failed to finish one task, not both. Only a couple of participants did not complete either
task. This would be most easily explained by the different cognitive demands invoked by the
two tasks as related to differences in participant strengths and weaknesses. Further research
would be required to confirm this.
It was interesting that 12 of the 45 participants did not complete the Learning Reversal
Task and/or the WCST. Their data were not entered into the analyses. For instance, some
participants did not reach criterion on the Learning Reversal Task. Because no criterion was
reached, reversal and post-reversal trials did not occur. Instead, the participants kept guessing in
the prereversal stage for the duration of the experiment, generating large numbers of trials as a
result. Likewise, several people never concluded the WCST. Instead, they attempted more than
one thousand problems before exceeding the allotted 1-hour time period. The participants, as
college students, presumably possessed the required intelligence to successfully complete both
tasks. Therefore, their failures were probably due to either inadequate instruction or motivation.
If insufficient instruction was the culprit, then it could be better elucidated for future participants.
Also, practice rounds could be provided with automated feedback describing to participants why
given responses are correct or incorrect. The practice rounds could be the same or different from
the actual tasks. Another reason for culling the data of these participants was the possibility that
they were not motivated to understand the rules of the game. Perhaps they desired to finish the
experiment early and proceeded to answer quickly and carelessly. To increase participant
motivation, the tasks could be designed so that high performers complete the tasks in a
substantially shorter period of time. Participants provided with this information would be more
motivated to perform well in order to complete the task early.
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For the Learning Reversal Task, the data showed that participants exhibited better
prereversal performance at the 80% criterion level than at the 67% criterion level in regards to
the number of problems learned to the criterion level (4.9 versus 3.6 problems) and the mean
number of trials to reach the criterion level (19 versus 24 trials). These results are surprising
because one would expect fewer trials to be required to obtain 67% success than 80% success.
Likewise, it would be expected that a greater number of problems would be learned
successfully in the lower criterion case.
Another unexpected result was that participants had a better mean TI at 67% criterion
level (0.75) than at 80% (0.68). In other words, their post-reversal-to-preversal performance
ratio was better for problems learned to a lower success rate. At first glance, this seems contrary
to Rumbaugh’s findings that more intelligent organisms (like the human participants in this
study) have a better TI for higher criterion levels. However, Rumbaugh’s findings only state that
this holds true relative to less intelligent organisms, between species rather than within species.
Nevertheless, the present data are not consistent with the principle that more learning should lead
to better transfer for intelligent organisms. If this finding were to replicate, it would undermine
the logic of the TI paradigm as a measure of intelligence.
It may also the case that higher TI averages for the lower initial criterion can be an
artifact of the way that TI is calculated. TI might be more intelligible if its components reflected
only performance that was above and beyond random guessing. As was discussed in the
introduction, the TIC measure I have proposed corrects for this effect by looking only at
performance greater than what would be expected with random guessing. In this formula, a TIC
= 0 would indicate equal pre- and post-reversal performance; and a perfect post-reversal
performance would yield TIC = 2.9 for 67% criterion and TIC = 1.7 for 80% criterion. Thus,
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perfect performance in the more severe case of under-learning (i.e. 67% vs. 80% criterion) is
better rewarded in the TIC score. In the Learning Reversal Task, the mean TIC is greater for the
80% criterion (0.16, which is about 9% of the optimal score) than for the 67% criterion (0.0063,
or less than 1% of the optimal score). As readily evident by these numbers, both of the effects
are modest and learning was better transferred in the 80% than 67% criterion cases.
Another possible issue could be that the minimum number of prereversal trials was too
low. Because random guessing should result in 50% correct selections, it would not be
uncommon for a participant to randomly guess 7 out of the first 10 problems correctly. In the
67% criterion, this would trigger the reversal and the posterior trials. Such a case is a false
positive of rule acquisition. Subsequently, the TI for that problem would not be measuring the
ability learn, change, or suppress a rule. These false positives would not occur in all cases, yet
they may have occurred frequently enough to increase the variability of the results. This could
be reduced by increasing the minimum number of prereversal trials. Unfortunately, this might
cause some problems to be learned to a greater extent than desired, especially in the 67% case.
To prevent this, a more complex problem could be utilized (i.e., one that has 5 digits instead of
4). As the complexity and minimum number of trials are increased, the likelihood of a
participant reaching criterion “on accident” would decrease.
Another way to reduce the effects of random successes while maintaining low criterion
levels would be to increase the number of choices. If there were three answers from which to
choose instead of two, then the chance of choosing correctly would be lowered from 50% to
33%. However, part of the benefit of the TI paradigm is that it measures critical levels of
underlearning. As such, it is necessary that the rule not be overly learned. As expected random
performance and actual performance diverge, so diminishes the level of under-learning.
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Therefore, criterion level of performance should probably be set in a way that reflects the level
of significance desired.
It is possible that there were extraneous distractions in the learning reversal task. For
example, the binary strings were presented at random vertical locations on the screen.
Participants who were more visuo-spatially oriented may have tried to sort by the vertical
location instead of by the prototype. With a greater number of variables to test, such participants
may have required a greater number of trials to learn the correct rule. Even though rule
acquisition may have taken longer, the participant should have been sorting by the prototype
when the criterion level was reached. It is uncertain how post-reversal performance would be
affected; however, a large effect is unlikely because the participant would quickly eliminate
extraneous sorting criteria after the first few successful trials.
This experiment contained unique research that is important for several reasons. First, it
examined TI and set switching in normally functioning, young adults. Previously, most of the
data available were generated by nonhuman animals and by humans with mental retardation.
Because relatively few errors would have been expected from the college-aged participants, the
WCST was manipulated in an attempt to increase the number of perseverations. This was
accomplished via a computer implementation of the task, which enabled it to be administered in
a speeded way via a shortened stimulus onset. New stimuli were presented immediately
following the feedback from the previous selection, which itself was brief. The fast-paced
format was desirable for testing the college population, in which few perseveration errors would
otherwise be expected. The computer-testing platform also allowed for improved experimental
control over the previous paper card version.
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Even though this experiment yielded unexpected results, they were nonetheless
important. Two cognitive mechanisms that were presumed to be quite similar were shown to be
significantly different. The ability to modify learning to solve novel problems stands out as the
leading candidate for this difference. It could be that our ability to consciously go against the
force of habit and instead rely on abstract rules is part of what we prize as intelligence. It could
also be this same ability that has given humankind an evolutionary advantage by enabling us to
find creative solutions in an ever-changing environment. If this is an important cause of our
success, then it would be worthwhile to determine the best way to measure it and teach it as a
skill.
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Figures

Figure 1. Learning Reversal Task screen shot.

Figure 2. Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST) screen shot, with pattern substituted for
color.
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Figure 3. Pre-reversal learning as indicated by the number of trials to reach the 67%
criterion level approaches significance in predicting the mean number of perseverations on the
WCST
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Figure 4. Learning reversal ability as measured by transfer index does not predict executive
functioning as measured by the WCST

